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ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to find out the economic outcome of joint forest management 
(JFM) programme for forest fringe community belonging to marginal landholding, small 
landholding and landless agricultural households and government who jointly manage the forest 
protection activities based on a field survey in West Bengal. This empirical study suggests that the 
economic outcome of the JFM programme has been beneficial for both and this is due to the strict 
dominant cooperative strategy of community. Economically government was the worst sufferer for 
her restrictive policy. The higher economic outcome of the government is due to the cooperation of 
community whom government neglected earlier. However, cooperation yields an outcome preferred 
by both parties under JFM programme as they are able to negotiate before the start of the game 
and obtain binding commitments. This study also suggests that force or law can not effectively 
control the illegal collection of timber forest products for the poor agricultural households, which 
mainly depend on forest resources for livelihood security and that live below poverty line, until and 
unless a considerable increase in the income from legal forest products and forest wage income 
meet their livelihood security. 
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I  Introduction 
Increasing interest in rural poverty alleviation has resulted in a new focus in the forest 
dependent poor (Fisher, 2004; Pattanayak et al., 2004; Angelsen and Winder, 2003; Kumar, 2002; 
Kumar et al., 2000; Arnold, 2001; World Bank, 2001; Wunder, 2001; Cavendish, 1999; Scherr et 
al., 2002; Somanathan, 1991). Forest contributes significantly to the economic, social and 
environmental well being of a country. Its role is more pronounced in a developing country like 
India that has a predominantly agriculture-based rural economy. Forest in India constitutes just over 
one-fifth of the land area of the country. Forest meets nearly 40 per cent of the energy needs of the 
country (more than 80 per cent in the rural sector), the bulk of it as direct subsidy to the poor. In 
India, fuelwood is a source of livelihood for more than eleven million people. An estimated fifty 
nine per cent of rural households in India obtain their wood from home-grown source or free 
collection (World Bank, 2006: 46); only twenty one per cent pay for all of their wood (Kohlin and 
Ostwald, 2001, cited in World Bank, 2006:46). It also provides about 25 per cent of the fodder 
needs of vast cattle population. Forest products are crucial to the rural and tribal economy. The 
dependence of tribal on forests for sustenance and income generation is also significant, ranging 
from 15 to 84 per cent, depending on the community and region (Sarmah and Rai, 2000:207). The 
World Bank Report (2006) indicates that forests offer vast potential for poverty reduction and rural 
economy growth in India while also supporting critical national conservation goals (World Bank, 
2006: xiii). The Report also revels that half of India’s 89 million tribal people, the most 
disadvantaged section of society, live in forest fringe areas and forests have the potential to improve 
the livelihoods of forest dwelling people, particularly tribal people who are the most disadvantaged 
group in Indian society (ibid:2). The overall estimate is that 33 per cent of the tribal earn their 
livelihood from forests and forest products (Sarmah and Rai, 2000:207). Many of the products, 
including non-timber forest products (NTFPs), provide sustenance to the Indian rural people who 
collect a large part of their day-to-day necessities, including food and medicines, from the forests 
(ibid). 
Issues relating to households’ income accounts in rural areas of southern Malawi in Africa are 
presented by Fisher (2004) in two sources – forest and non-forest (farm, self-employment, non-
forest wage work, sales assets and transfers)1. There is rich empirical evidence to support the claim 
that forest is an important source of income for the poor forest fringe households through the 
extraction of wood (timber and firewood) and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) or non-wood 
forest products (NWFPs) by preserving the forest resource sustainable with the help of cooperative 
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management (Somanathan, 1991; Pattanayak et al., 2004; Guha, 1989; Jodha, 1986, 1992; Kumar et 
al., 2000; World Bank, 2001). In an attempt to measure the effect of JFM on various social groups – 
landless, marginal farmer, small farmer, medium farmer and large farmer – Kumar(2002) observes 
that the poorer sections of village community are disproportionally dependent on non-wood forest 
products both for subsistence and extra income due to low opportunity cost of labour (p.770). 
Access to forest for fuelwood is substantially important to local people and makes substantial 
contribution to households’ welfare (Pattanayak et al., 2004: 176). The demand for fuelwood 
collection for poor households is inelastic with respect to their travel cost (or the shadow price of 
fuelwood) indicating that fuelwood is essential for these households, whereas improved economic 
conditions that increase household wealth and raise opportunity cost reduce household’s 
dependence on fuel wood from forest (ibid:175). Asset-poor in Malawi in southern Africa are 
observed more reliant on both low return forest activities (LRFA) – e.g. fuel wood and non-timber 
forest products – and high return forest activities (HRFA) – e.g. timber – compared with the better 
off and access to forest income in rural Malawi help the poor not only to prevent by supplementing 
income but also to improve their living standard over time (Fisher, 2004: 147-151). Without any 
legal punishment by law, traditional cooperative management system based on self-enforcing social 
norms and customs – each person knows that if they cheat, the other will as well, and to their supply 
of forest products in years to come will be jeopardized – were enough to restrain people from 
removing trees from forest and the prevailing conditions ensures that the forest dependent 
households did not suffer from a scarcity of forest resource on which they were so dependent 
(Somanathan, 1991:PE 38-9). 
With the increasing presence of forest products in the market economy, greater importance for 
livelihood sustenance of forest fringe communities on forest resource and a greater understanding of 
the non-tangible benefits from forests, the concept of community forest management, like JFM, has 
naturally brought to the fore various interrelated issues concerning forest management, and the past 
working of the forests, allegedly only for timber extraction and industrial supplies, has come in for 
criticism. For nearly four decades or so environmentalists, conservationists, foresters, researchers, 
planners, policy makers and social scientists have been engaged in an intense debate on appropriate 
policy strategies (to reach at some consensus) as to how a sustainable livelihood from forest and 
NTFPs in particular could be ensured to forest dependent communities. In keeping with these policy 
strategies, there has been a shift over from revenue oriented forest management to conservation and 
that is related to participatory community based approaches in most of the developing countries 
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during the last one and a half decade (Bhattacharya, 2001:107). The main trends of the forest 
policies in the developing countries include replacement of uncontrolled exploitation, selected areas 
with conservation of forest, more plantations and community and social forestry, sharing of benefits 
with the forest dependent communities, involving communities and the management of forests, and 
encouraging communities to participate to some extent in decision-making (ibid:107). Concerning 
to the cooperative management in JFM, it is said that forestry can play a significant role for the well 
being of the people living in and around the forest areas and, conversely, these people can play a 
major part in making the forests around them more productive under local management partnership 
between the state and local communities. In keeping with this, a consensus has also emerged in both 
academic and policy-making bodies about the desirability cooperative model for the management of 
forest resources. The World Bank Learning Group on Participatory Development defined 
participation as process through which stakeholders’ influence and share control over development 
initiatives, and the decisions and resources that affect them (World Bank, 1995:3; World Bank, 
1996; Banki, 1981). This definition acknowledges the sharing of benefits derived from the projects 
by the beneficiaries of projects and participation as a growth and development. The World Bank’s 
1991 Forest Strategy, in fact, emphasized greater involvement of local people in the long-term 
management of natural forests (World Bank, 2000:15). The ad-hoc intergovernmental panel or 
forests emphasized the crucial importance of sustainable forest management at the fourth session of 
the Eleventh World Forestry Congress held in October 13-22, 1997. The observation of the panel 
does contribute to an emerging consensus on the feasibility of sustainable livelihood approach of 
forest fringe communities through decentralized planning and participatory forest management. 
Moreover the Rio Summit of 1992, which happened to be turning point in the world environment 
history, paved milestone in the way of sustainability and further strengthened the concept of 
decentralized planning community participation to sustain forest management (Bhattacharya, 
2001:13). Community participation between the state and local communities has been globally 
accepted as a concept and essential tool for the sustainability of natural resources. The National 
Forest Policy of 1988 in India has also recognized the interdependence between people and forests, 
and envisages active community participation in the protection and development of forestlands for 
sustainability of forest management. Managing forests primarily with a view to protecting, 
developing and utilizing the non-timber forest products (NTFPs) is being recommended for 
sustainable forest management. Research studies conducted on Orissa, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya 
Pradesh and Bihar indicate that over 80 per cent of forest dwellers exclusively depend on NTFPs for 
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their daily subsistence and livelihood (Beer and McDermott, 1989; Campbell, 1993; 
Chandrasekharan, 1998; Gupta and Guleria, 1982; Mallik, 1994, 2000). The new policy lays 
emphasis on meeting the local needs in particular of the tribal and the rural poor living near the 
forest and in safeguarding their traditional rights and concessions subject to the carrying capacity of 
the forests. Livelihood sustenance issue also relates to sustainable harvest of NTFPs which ensures 
negligible impact on the structure and the dynamics of the plant production (Mallik, 2000:386). 
However, sustainability relies on political, socio-economic and a set of institutional factors. But in 
the context of sustainability of forest resources what appears to be crucial is who these end-users 
are. The users may be government, community groups or local forest users. To this end, the 
requirements of the fuelwood, fodder, other non-timber forest products and construction of timber 
required by tribal and rural poor living near the forests for their consumptive and productive 
purposes have been regarded as the first charge on forests. The National Forest Policy of 1988 in 
India stipulates that the forestry activities be so designed to facilitate improvements in the socio-
economic condition of the rural poor and tribal communities. In addition to this, sustainable yield of 
timber production for expanding government revenue has also been regarded as other important 
objective of forest management. 
This paper, thus, attempts to find out the economic outcome of JFM programme for forest fringe 
communities and government who jointly manage the forest protection activities, based on a field 
survey of Bankura district in West Bengal. The present paper is important in that it tries to examine 
as to whether the institutional arrangements of community management under JFM have been 
economically beneficial for its member households belonging to agricultural households under three 
categories – landless, marginal farmer and small farmer – which depends on forest for their 
subsistence and income, compared with strict regulatory policy system of government before JFM, 
and contribute to extract forest resources sustainably. This paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents the historical perspective of the study. A short review of relevant common pool resource 
(CPR) game is contained in section III. Section IV deals with survey design and methodology of the 
empirical exercise. Section V covers the findings of the study. Conclusions and policy implications 
appear in section VI. 
 
II  Historical Perspective  
The revision of the National Forest Policy in 1988 marks a major departure from the earlier 
policies which emphasize on production of commercial wood and disregard for local need 
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(Poffenberger, 1995; Sarmah and Rai, 2000: 213), because Government of India, then, could 
understand that until and unless the benefit of forest fringe communities is secured, neither forest 
resources nor forest management can be sustainable. So, in order to execute sustainable forest 
management system, the active participation of local forest communities in forest management for 
conservation and development plans of forest resources and the participatory forest management on 
usufruct sharing basis for safeguarding their traditional rights subject to the carrying capacity of 
forest was first introduced and implemented by the National Forest Policy of 1988. 
However, far-reaching developments in the demographic, economic, social and 
environmental fields have resulted in the revision of the National Forest Policy in 1988. The 
national policy of 1988 constitutes a significant departure from earlier policies of forest 
management practice, for it emphasizes on: 1) obtaining the active participation of local people in 
forest conservation and development programmes of local forest lands; and 2) the benefit sharing 
arrangements, which is intended to provide village communities living near the forests a stake in the 
protection and development on the degraded forests. 
JFM programmes in India currently span over 27 states, represent 85000 village 
communities, and cover more than 17.3 million hectors of forestland. The programme encompasses 
an estimated 8.3 million families, half of which are SC and ST (Bahuguna, 2004, cited in World 
Bank, 2006:1). Most JFM committees use the surrounding forests mainly as a safety net or for 
regular or seasonal subsistence production of firewood, fodder and minor forest products.  
The JFM in West Bengal has its origin in the success achieved in rejuvenating a patch of 17 
hectares of degraded forests under a pilot project implemented during 1972 near Arabari in 
Midnapore district. About 618 families living in 11 villages lying in the fringe voluntarily protected 
these forests when in return they were assured provision of fuelwood and fodder from the 
regenerated forest and employment in forestry activities. In 1987 these villagers were also declared 
as beneficiaries for these rejuvenated forests and granted 25 per cent share from the revenue earned 
from final harvest. This project made both government and community benefited (SFR, 2000:47). It 
seems to be relevant to mention that the key precursor to JFM in India, from a management 
perspective, was a local level initiative, dating from the early 1970s, in the Arabari in West Bengal 
(Jeffery and Sundar, 1999:28). 
In West Bengal, the JFM movement gathered momentum when in 1989 a programme of 
resuscitation and reestablishment of moribund sal and other hardwood forests in the districts of 
Midnapore, Bankura, Purulia, Burdwan and Birbhum in south West Bengal was initiated by the 
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government with the active participation and involvement of the local people. West Bengal 
government’s resolution in 1989 was issued by declaring the principles of sharing of duties, 
responsibilities as well as the usufructs from the forests to the participant local people living in the 
fringe of the forests. The procedures for establishment of the institution called forest protection 
committee (FPC), comprising of these participants as members, were also defined. The foundation 
of an innovative forest protection system and the participatory forest management was thus laid for 
the forests of south West Bengal which covers approximately 38 per cent of the total forest area of 
the State. West Bengal State Forest Report (2000) clearly mentions: 
“As a result of participatory and joint forest management activities in south West Bengal the 
vast tract of scattered, over-exploited and degraded forests containing mainly the sal were 
resuscitated and restored to productivity with great improvement in quality and density” (SFR, 
2000: 47). 
Government report (State Forest Report, 2000) reveals that the overexploitation of trees for 
timber was so severe that thousand and thousand hectares of forest lands in the south West Bengal 
except Sundarban were almost treated as bare plain land, when the JFM was established; but such 
lands are almost secured after JFM programme. Secondly, government revenue from the degraded 
forest was almost nil when the JFM was established, but it has significantly increased after JFM. 
However, with regard to the historical perspective of the Government of India in general and 
Government of West Bengal in particular are concerned, we usually observe two forest policies of 
the government – strictly regulatory policy (SRP) and cooperative policy (CP). The SRP was usually 
used before 1988 when the JFM was established and CP has been executing as soon as the JFM 
came into being. Hence the strategy-set of government is {SRP, CP}.  
On the contrary, against the custodian forest management system (SRP action of 
government), the local forest fringe communities in different parts of India have mobilized 
repeatedly from long past to protect their traditional right on forest (Poffenberger, 1995). With 
regard to the south West Bengal (Midnapore, Bankura, Purulia, Burdwan and Birbhum), including 
our study area, is concerned, Santal, Bhumij and Mahato tribal, with some low cast Hindus, 
mobilized repeatedly against Mughal and British rulers to protect their traditional rights on 
forestland from long past (Sarker and Das, 2004:172). Chur Rebellion (from 1767 to 1805), Naik 
Revolt (1806-16), Hul Rebellion (1855) are the glaring examples of the history in south West 
Bengal where forest fringe communities organized resistance against rulers of India to protect their 
own right in forestland. It is said that during Hul Rebellion (on July 16, 1855) some ten thousand 
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tribal, under the messianic leadership of four Santal brothers stood their ground firmly and fought 
with bows and a kind of battle-axe in a battle near Pirpaiti (Dutta, 1940:26). The revolt collapsed 
eventually after half their members were reportedly killed. Despite their defeat, the Hul Rebellion 
(as it is known among the Santal) profoundly influenced the ideological development of many 
Santal communities (Duyker, 1987:35), and lives on in the songs and oral traditions of the tribal 
people of this area. 
JFM can, thus, be seen to emerge as the major policy change and attempt to create a new 
relationship between the government and the community in terms of cooperative framework. Thus, 
from the standpoint of the forest fringe community is concerned, one may usually find two actions 
of the community on its forestland – fighting policy (FP), which was mainly executed when 
government’s SRP was in operation. They usually executed this policy to meet up their livelihood 
security. The cooperative policy (CP) of forest fringe communities has been gaining ground on as 
soon as the JFM programme came into being. So the community’s strategy-set is {FP, CP}. 
This empirical study is important in that it might help us examine whether, unlike earlier 
forest policies which emphasize on production of commercial wood and disregard for local need, 
the 1988 Forest Policy of India and thereafter West Bengal Government’ JFM resolution in June 
1989, which for the first time specifies the rights of the protecting communities with the help of 
establishing Forest Protection Committees/Village Forest Committees over forest lands through 
their active participation in the protection and development of forest lands, has been effective on 
meeting the local needs in particular of the tribal and the poor living near the forests and expanding 
government revenue from timber subject  to the carrying capacity of forests. 
 
III  Review of the Relevant CPR Game 
The daily livelihood of vast masses of the rural poor in many countries depends on the success 
with which common pool resources (CPRs) – such as forest and water resources – are managed and 
on the environmental consequences of their management. “CPR (common pool resource) 
management is a collective action dilemma: a situation in which mutual cooperation is collectively 
rational for the group as a whole, but individual cooperation is not necessarily individually rational 
for each member”(Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 2002:577). There is now a vast literature which 
examines the problem of extracting commonly owned renewable resources by game-theoretic 
framework (Clark, 1980; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Ostrom et al., 1990; Gardner et al., 1990; 
Ostrom et al., 1992; Chichilnisky, 1994; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996; Dayton-Johnson and 
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Bardhan, 2002). Game theory provides a useful tool for many problems in environmental 
economics. The theory is concerned with the strategic action of different agents/players where these 
actions are in some way interlinked. It is said that the absence of private property rights in common 
property resources is characterized by a negative externality whenever the resource is scare; this 
leads to inefficiently high levels of extraction, possibly high enough to exceed the maximum 
sustainable yield, and threaten thereby the long run viability of the resource. But there is 
considerable literature of common pool resource game which suggests that cooperative management 
of common property resources guided by social norms and customs have been successful over long 
period of time (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Williamson, 1985; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 
1990; Hecheter, 1987; Acherson, 1993; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996). In a study of CPR institution, 
Cordell and McKean (1992) identity the established codes of conduct which are far more binding on 
individual conscience than any governmental regulations. These codes of conduct serve to ensure 
both sustainable aggregate harvests and an equitable distribution of access to the resource. Acheson 
(1993) is another example of sustainable management of common resources based on customs and 
social norms. In fact, self-organized CPR institutions have been devised without reference to 
centralized authorities and sustained over long period of time (Hechter, 1987; Willamson, 1985). 
Empirical evidence suggests that individuals facing social dilemmas in many cases develop credible 
ex ante commitments without relying on external authorities: appropriation from CPRs have 
repeatedly shown their capacity to organize themselves, establish credible commitments, monitor 
each other behavior and impose sanctions on those who breaks their commitments (Gardner et al., 
1990; Ostrom et al., 1990). Ostrom et al. (1992) find that high level of cooperation can be sustained 
for the management of CPRs if the possibility of pre-game communication is present, with or 
without the possibility of costly sanctions. The game-theoretic model of Sethi and Somanathan 
(1996) suggests that cooperative behavior guided by social norms of restraint may be stable to run 
the common property resources and pastures in a well defined sense against invasion by narrowly 
self-interested behavior; when the social norms break down, it generally lead to the lowering of the 
long run stock, and possibly to its extraction (p.766). This model follows from Somanathan’s (1991) 
empirical evidence which describes a variety of traditional arrangement guided by social norms, 
customs and courtesy designed to enable Himalayan villages in India exploit their common forest 
sustainably without the possibility of costly sanctions. The CPR game of our study which emerges 
from our empirical evidence seeks to examine as to whether the interaction between community and 
government over a trade off between economic outcome from extracting commonly owned 
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renewable forest resource is beneficial for both guided by a variety of institutional arrangements 
under JFM programme leading to exploit forest resource more sustainably compared with the 
system of strict regulatory policy (SRP) of government before JFM. 
 
IV Survey Design and Methodology 
a) The data set 
The data have been collected through an intensive field enquiry covering all members from 
three sample female FPCs and three joint FPCs under Bankura district2 of West Bengal. We have 
taken samples from all forest divisions – Bankura (North), Bankura (South) and Panchayet (SC) – 
under Bankura district, because almost all female FPCs exist in this district only. For the selection 
of female FPCs, random sampling technique (SRSWOR) is used. First, we have taken three sample 
female FPCs, taking one from each division of the district with the method of SRSWOR. Second, 
we have taken all members of each sample female FPC for our study. The number of members of 
each female FPC has been collected from the records of the respective FPC. However, total 
members from three sample-female FPCs are 120 in number – Brindabanpur (56), Agua (23), and 
Malibona (41). To make a comparative study of FPC members between female FPCs and joint 
FPCs, we take three joint FPCs along with three sample female FPCs for our study. First, each joint 
FPC has been selected based on the criterion of close proximity (nearest distance in km.) to each 
sample female FPC. Second, all members of joint FPCs have been selected for our final survey. 
Total number of members from three joint FPCs works out to 182 in number – Katul-2 (93), 
Balboni (44), and Baragari (45). However, total number of members selected for our field survey 
including female and joint FPCs, work out to 302. It is worth mentioning that each FPC was formed 
in the respective village. So FPC/village is synonymous in the study. 
The data of six FPC-villages under our study were considered for two-time points – before 
JFM and after JFM situations. The period of collecting data for ‘after situation’ in all FPCs is same 
– between April 2005 and March 2006. But the period of data for ‘before situation’ was not same to 
all FPCs. JFM programme in Agua, Belboni, Malibona, Baragari, Brindabanpur and  Katul-2 FPC-
villages was started on February 1993, February 1993, March 1996, December 1996, April 1991 
and September 1990 respectively. ‘Before situation’ for each FPC is considered for the preceding 
one-year period from the starting of JFM programme in the respective FPCs. For example, ‘before 
situation’ in Agua FPC-village was between February 1992 and January 1993. But the major 
problems in measuring different socio-economic indicators are the level of measurement 
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(household/village/community/group), types of statistical information (variable/attribute), 
difficulties in ascribing the changes to a particular programme (like JFM programme) from other 
variables (programmes) influencing these changes, unit of measurement (for example 
kilograms/days/standard cattle). To some extent, these problems or limitations can be dealt with 
through the adoption of appropriate techniques of data generation and estimation procedures. An 
appropriate baseline survey of the households would contribute to capture the changes better. But 
such baseline data set are often not available; the problem in such cases is that we cannot observe 
the participating households without observing the programme at the same time. This is the major 
loophole of this study. One way of addressing this problem is to have a control group, which is 
similar to the participating group in all respects except the programme so that the control group may 
act as the counter factual of the participating group. But it is difficult to find such a matching group 
in this study, because there is hardly any household of forest fringe communities without JFM 
programme in the area we surveyed.  Even the recent JFM programmes operating in this area 
originated before the year 2002. A second best solution in this regard is reflexive comparison where 
‘before’ and ‘after’ scenarios are compared for the participating households. This would be helpful 
to provide reasonable estimates of the impact provided that there is no serious memory lapse 
problem among the respondents (Ravallion, 2001). But memory lapse is directly related to the time, 
which passes away after initiating the programme. By using the ‘double difference’ method where 
‘before’ and ‘after’ situations are examined for both control and participating groups, these biases 
can be further minimized. Due to non-availability of data of matching control group for the causes 
mentioned earlier, we had to depend on ‘reflexive comparison’ where ‘before’ and ‘after’ situations 
are examined for participating groups only. ‘Before’ and ‘after’ estimation are analyzed for all 
households involved in the JFM programme under our study. More importantly, the share of timber 
sale received by each FPC from the forest department was equally distributed among all households 
irrespective of the economic status of households. 
b) Evaluation of cost and revenue 
Total revenue and total cost of rural forest fringe households under our survey are estimated 
on two sources – forest and non-forest – during both the situations – before and after JFM. As 
regards revenue is concerned, forest source of revenue is generated from sale of timber, fuelwood 
and non-timber forest products, and forestry wage labour. Revenue from forest resource is of two 
types: legal (YL) and illegal (YI). Legal income from forest resource is generated from LRFA (like 
fuelwood, non-timber forest products), forest wage income and legal share of timber products from 
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forest department. Illegal income from forest resource yields from illegal collection of timber 
(HRFA). Non-forest revenue, on the other hand, rises out of the sale of agricultural farm crops, non-
forest wage labour (mainly from agricultural farm labour) and others (self employed business 
activities like market middleman, tailoring,  radio and cycle-rickshaw repairing, sale of livestock 
and its products, personal and household items, etc.). Income from ‘others’ constitute a very little 
part of their total income for our surveyed households during both the situations – before and after 
JFM. Most of the households receive their part-time income from their self-employed business 
activities as their ‘others’ sources of income, the major income being the forest source. Almost all 
households under our study during both the situations receive income from their domestic livestock 
and it is the major part of their income from ‘others’ source. But out of the total surveyed 
households (302 in number), the part-time income other than livestock under ‘others’ source is 
insignificant: only nine households from market middlemen, three households from tailoring and 
two households from radio and cycle-rickshaw repairing receive a small part of their total income 
during after situation of JFM, although before JFM they did not receive income from the same 
source. However, non-forest income is of two types: agricultural-crop source and ‘others’ (almost 
from livestock). It is worthwhile to mention that to estimate income for forest fringe households 
under our study we use the household production framework (Pattanayak and Sills, 2001; Zorn, 
1998; Pattanayak, et al., 2004). The household production framework seems to be appropriate for 
describing this situation because this framework contributes to household’s production of utility-
yielding services from forest (legal and illegal) and non-forest (agricultural-crop and livestock) 
sources for their own consumption and generating income: household’s own labour for forest sector, 
household’s own labour and capital (land, plough, etc.) for agricultural-crop sector, and their own 
labour and capital for livestock are used as primary inputs in the production process. The procedures 
of estimation of cost and revenue during both before and after JFM situations are evaluated as 
follows. 
As forest is a common pool environmental resource and its harvest gives both tangible and 
intangible benefits, there are some problems in estimating the cost of forest benefit to the users 
(forest dependent households). Even if we exclude the intangible part (which is indirect and non-
marketable benefit like watershed benefit, ecosystem service and biodiversity conservation), some 
problems remain. As mentioned earlier, the forest source of benefit or revenue is of two types (legal 
and illegal) consisting of three sources – NTFPs, forestry wage and TFPs (which combine share 
from government’s timber sale and sale of illegal extraction of timber together). Basically, forest 
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dependent households under our study do not bear any direct cost for their forest income because 
they do not pay any direct fees/taxes to the forest department for their extraction of forest products; 
although they incur some costs as protection of forest resource like monitoring and patrolling the 
forest, almost all protection costs are usually paid by forest department regularly in monetary unit 
(in Rs.). However, cost component of the households under our study from the forest income is the 
opportunity cost of labour for their collection, processing and/or marketing of forest products. But 
the main problem in estimating opportunity cost of labour is to evaluate whether we should consider 
the local wage rate or the forestry wage rate as the opportunity cost of labour because the surveyed 
households of our study have to work as wage labour under both forest and non-forest sectors. As 
regards forest wage rate is concerned, the prevailing wage rate for forest wage labour is fixed at 
Rs.67.50 /- which is about a double of the average local wage rate for crop farm sector, for usually 
eight hours of service from 8am to 4pm. But forest wage rate and the number of working days as 
wage labour under forest department by the forest fringe households are fixed. Usually, one person 
from each household with a family size of five or less gets the opportunity of forest work from 35-
40 days per year. If the size of member of a household is greater than five, usually, two persons get 
the opportunity for forest wage work for 70-80 days in total per year. In this perspective, we 
consider local market wage rate of non-forest sector as the opportunity cost of labour because the 
working days and wage rate under non-forest work turns out to be a variable which is not fixed as 
forest wage work. The other important problem in estimating opportunity cost of labour for 
collecting, processing and/or marketing of forest products is that the time and hours of collection, 
processing and/or marketing are not fixed. Collection, processing and/or marketing may execute at 
any time and at any period usually between dawn to duck. Moreover, women and girls constitute the 
major segment of the collection and processing of NTFPs. In the face of these facts, we have 
calculated cost based on the actual period (duration) the collector households spent on collecting, 
processing and/or marketing of the forest products. For example, if a collector 
(man/woman/boy/girl) spends on two hours for collecting forest products, his/her opportunity cost 
of labour is calculated for two hours based on the local wage rate (for the respective category). 
Forest resource provides a variety of goods and services to its users for their current benefit 
like timber and non-timber forest products. Hence they are said to have ‘use value’ which is 
consumptive or/and productive (Kadekodi, 2001:290-1). The most significant problem in estimating 
such benefit or revenue from the forest products for forest fringe households under our study is that 
either the collectors do not sale the entire portion of their collections or the markets for forest 
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products are sometimes thin or missing. A considerable portion is consumed by the collector 
households. However, the appropriate method  used  in this case is based on sound economic theory. 
One may assume two possible cases: (i) when a market for a forest product exists and (ii) when 
market for a close substitutable/surrogate exists. Whenever market exists for any forest product, the 
market price is used for valuing revenue of the product. The value of various timber forest products 
and a wide range of NTFPs like fuelwood, sal seeds/leaves, kendu leaves, medicinal plants, some 
food items (mainly mushroom) fall into this category. But what does one do if there is no market for 
a particular use of product under consideration? The product may have alternative uses with 
revealed market price or may have alternative product to substitute for. Methods such as 
opportunity/replacement cost basically draw upon market data and information on prices and values 
for such alternatives or substitutes. Moreover, surrogate prices are hypothetical market prices taken 
from such products which are close substitute for those products. The present study considers 
surrogate price for valuation of fodder and ritual items and opportunity cost for valuation of the 
residual forest products (other than the forest products mentioned above). While calculating price 
per unit of forest product, we consider producer’s price for the quantity of product which the 
collectors actually sold; for their consumable part, we consider consumer’s price. 
Now we turn to study the estimation procedure of total cost and total revenue related to 
agricultural crop under our surveyed households. But the computation of cost of cultivation of 
agricultural crop is, no doubt, a controversial issue. Agricultural farm’s cost is the combination of 
materials and services of heterogeneous nature and, therefore, a number of conceptual and 
methodological issues are involved in estimating the cost of cultivation of individual crops. 
However, realizing the seriousness of this problem, Government of India appointed expert 
committee headed by Hanumantha Rao for developing the concept of estimating the cost of 
production of agricultural produce (GoI, 1990). As per recommendations of the Committee, the 
items of cost of cultivation cover both the paid out costs and the imputed costs. The paid cost 
includes (i) hired labour (human, animal and machinery), (ii) maintenance expenses on owned 
animals and machinery, (iii) expense on material inputs, (iv) depreciation on implements, machinery 
and farm building, (v) land revenue, (vi) miscellaneous expenditure, and (vii) interest on working 
capital. The imputed cost consists of value of family labour, rental value of owned land and interest 
on owned fixed capital. Hired human labour cost is evaluated from the actual wages paid by the 
farmer. The valuation of family labour is also a controversial issue among farm economists. The 
evaluation of family labour has been decided at the market wage rate prevailing in the locality. The 
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managerial functions performed by the family members are evaluated on the basis of the time spent 
with the family, the labour wage rate and the actual expenses incurred for traveling, etc. In the 
present study depreciation charges of fixed assets is worked out by the Straight Line Method using 
the following formula: Depreciation = (Original cost – Junk value) ÷ Life of the asset. Fixed capital 
(excluding land) used by the cultivating households (marginal and small landholders) under our 
study is cattle and plough (made by wood). There is no other fixed asset (like tractor, pumping 
machine, shallow tube-well) possessed by any cultivator households. The irrigation facility the 
cultivators used in the study area is through cannel system from government irrigation project. The 
cost of irrigation is not included under the cost of fixed assets. The junk value of cattle is assumed 
to be nil, because if cattle die they do not possess any junk value to the households under our study. 
Junk value of plough is considered as the ‘use value’ of fuelwood consumption because when 
plough is ineffective to function, it is used by the cultivating households for fuelwood. Original cost 
and lifetime of the cattle and plough are estimated based on the practical information available from 
our surveyed households. There are some problems in the valuation of interest on working capital. 
The major problems are the rate of interest and the period over which interest is charged. Working 
capital in this study is evaluated in terms of (a) owned and (b) borrowed (mainly, non-institutional) 
capital. While the actual interest paid out is taken into account for the borrowed capital, the interest 
on owned capital is estimated at the same rate the borrowed capital is worked out. The interest rate 
of borrowed capital is calculated on the basis of their non-institutional (informal) borrowing 
because the surveyed households under our study usually borrowed from non-institutional source 
during both the situations. It is worth noting that there are only three cases of formal borrowing 
(only from small landholding households) during after situation of JFM, whereas there was no 
formal borrowing by any category of households during before situation of JFM under our study. 
The annual average rate of interest for informal borrowed capital is estimated as around 32 per cent 
during after JFM situation, whereas it was evaluated as 41 per cent during before JFM situation. If 
any household employs owned capital instead of borrowed capital, the interest of the owned capital 
of that household is evaluated at the same interest rate the borrowed capital (non-institutional) is 
worked out. To compute rental value for owned land, a number of alternative procedures have been 
suggested. Important among them are (i) an appropriate rate of interest on the value of land, (ii) 
market rent, and (iii) a fixed proportion of output. Since land values are high due to pressures 
external to agriculture, we have resorted to estimate the rental value of owned land on the basis of 
prevailing rent in the village for identical type of land. The expenditure incurred or imputed for 
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some of the cost items relate to the agricultural farm crop as a whole. These cost items are estimated 
under joint costs. Joint costs are allocated to depreciation on farm buildings and implements, land 
rent, interest on owned capital, cesses and taxes, etc. because such costs are allocated to all crop 
enterprises in a particular land over the whole year. This study also estimates these joint costs for all 
crop enterprises as a whole in a particular land over the whole year during both the situations – 
before and after JFM. 
The total revenue of agricultural crop is estimated at the annual gross return from all 
agricultural crops earned by the cultivating households under our study during both the situations – 
before and after JFM. Producer’s price for the agricultural crop is considered for the valuation of 
agricultural products the households actually marketed. But consumer’s price is considered for the 
valuation of the proportion of agricultural produces the households used for self-consumption or 
retained for self-consumption. 
As regards cost related to livestock is concerned, usually two types of costs – labour and 
capital – are borne by the surveyed households as primary inputs for livestock during both the 
situations under our study. Opportunity cost of labour is considered for cattle grazing, but for fowl 
no such cost is necessary for the households we surveyed. The necessary capital requires for 
livestock is of two types – fixed (cage/building for shelter) and working (for feeding) capitals. Fixed 
capital used by the owners of livestock is mainly ‘kaacha’ cage made by wood. The estimation of 
fixed and working capitals of livestock is evaluated on the similar procedure adopted in estimating 
cost of capitals for agricultural crop. The total revenue of livestock is estimated at the annual gross 
return from the sale of livestock and the products of livestock. 
c) Methods of strategy set 
As regards the strategy-set of community is concerned, two FPCs – Baragari joint FPC and 
Brindabanpur female FPC – out of six provide some distinguishing features. First, Baragari joint 
FPC under Bankura (South) forest division came into existence in December 1996, although the 
West Bengal Government’s initiative for JFM programme was operative in this forest division on 
and from 1989, during this period, i.e. from 1989 to 1996, the government policy was cooperative 
but Baragari community’s strategy was ‘fighting’. This is mainly because of more heterogeneous 
community structure and high endemic factionalism among the community members in this village. 
Secondly, the establishment of Brindabanpur female FPC under Bankura’s Panchayet (SC) Forest 
Division is a classic example in that a) it is the first female FPC not only in West Bengal but also in 
India; its leader Mrs. Parul Lohar was awarded Government of India’s honour for her noble work; 
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still she is the leader of this FPC; and b) unlike the usual practice, the primary initiative for the 
establishment of FPC was taken by the collective action of the members of this locality3. The 
members of this FPC came forward at first for the establishment of female FPC in their locality and 
local forest officials responded after three years. By this transition period community’s policy was 
cooperative but government policy was strict (SRP). The distinguishing feature of Brindabanpur 
female FPC and Baragari joint FPC, however, helps us calculate the economic outcome of forest 
fringe community and government for their two distinct strategy profiles {FP, CP} and {CP, SRP}, 
the first and second actions of each distinct strategy profile being the community and the 
government respectively, based on our field survey. 
This study considers simple technique of measurement like arithmetic mean, proportion, and 
tabular analysis for examining our stated objective. The outcome of the strategy profiles of 
government and community has been explained in simple game theoretic approach. Additionally, a 
simple mathematical model is also used for our study. 
 
V  Findings 
At the very outset, we examine some basic characteristics of our sample FPCs (Table 1). First, 
all members of FPCs – both female and joint – in five FPCs out of six are either SC or ST (column 
11).  In Baragari joint FPC, about 90 per cent of members do not belong to SC/ST. Second, about 
43 per cent of households (129 out of 302 cases) are landless, about 45 per cent of households are 
marginal and the rest, about 12 per cent are small (columns 7, 8 and 9 respectively). In our sample 
there is no household, which belongs to medium or big category4. Third, over 77 per cent of 
households in each village live below poverty line5 (column 5), the incidence of poverty being the 
lowest in Baragari (77.78 percentage). Fourth, except Baragari and Katul-2, majority of members in 
each village are illiterate (column 12). This study, however, indicates the abject economic and social 
conditions of the tribal people who are among the most disadvantaged group in rural Indian society. 
Table 2 presents annual net real income (in Rs.) of sample households from forest source, non- 
forest source and from all sources along with the change of income between two time points. The 
real income (in Rs.) is determined after deflating the money income by cost of living index (general) 
of agricultural labourer. As mentioned earlier, we consider the year 2005-06 as the base year. In 
doing so we use the technique of splicing (which consists in combining two or more overlapping 
series of index number to obtain a single continuous series) 6. Table 2 shows the following 
important results: 1) annual net real income (in Rs.) for all categories of households under our 
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sample except small land holding households in Baragai joint FPC have considerably increased 
(ranging between 12.84 and 41.56 percentage points) after JFM (column 11); 2) the increase of the 
annual net real income of households from all sources is only due to the net increase in income from 
forest source after JFM (column 9); 3) the annual net income from non-forest source of sample 
households in all FPCs has decreased to a large extent (column 10); 4) the dependence on forest 
income for all categories of households has considerably increased after JFM(column 3). Before 
JFM programme the annual net real income from forest source out of annual net income from all 
sources from sample households ranges between 61.56 percentage point and 78.51 percentage 
points (column 6). It implies that forest was major source of income for all categories before JFM; 
5) after JFM, annual net income of forest fringe communities has made a substantial increase. After 
JFM programme, the contribution of annual net real income from forest source out of annual net 
real income from all sources from sample households works out between 65.84 and 89.62 
percentage points except Baragari FPC (column 3); and 6) the incidence of the dependence on forest 
income is much lower for the households belonging to the better economic position on land status 
after JFM programme (column 9). It is important to mention that per capita annual net real income 
from forest source (PCANRIFS) is considered as the economic outcome (payoff) of the community. 
In order to calculate PCANRIFS, annual net real income from forest source of all sample 
households is divided by total number of members (calculated from columns 3 and 6 respectively in 
Table 2).  
The share of annual net real income derived from different sources of forest and non-forest 
sectors for agricultural households (landless, marginal farmer and small farmer) of six FPC-villages 
(during before and after situations of JFM programme) under our study appears in Table 3. Some 
important features that emerge from Table 3 are: i) forest sources – NTFPs, forestry wage and 
timber forest products (TFPs) – account for major share of annual net real income for all categories 
of households both after and before JFM programme situations. After JFM net return from all non-
forest sources – farm, non-forest wage and others – have decreased for all categories of households 
except farm income for only small farmer households in Baragari FPC. Conversely, annual net real 
income from two forest sources – NTFPs and forest wage – has increased for all except NTFPs 
source in one category of households – small farmer households in Baragari FPC. As the households 
of small farmer of Baragari FPC could not diversify their income generating activities within forest 
sources – for example, NTFPs – like others, their share of farm income increases by about 11 
percentage after JFM, although their share of annual net real income from farm source out of their 
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annual net real income from all sources are below 20 per cent before and after JFM. ii) more than 80 
per cent of annual net real income of landless and marginal farmer households, who are relatively 
asset poor and that also live below poverty line, come from forest sources except annual net real 
income of the same categories of households under Baragari FPC after JFM programme, whereas 
the contribution of net forest income was at best about 65 percentage for the same categories of 
households before JFM (Table 2). The significant increase of forest income after JFM is due to two 
sources – NTFPs and forest wage, the highest contribution being the NTFPs source (Table 3). 
However, the incidence of forest income is higher for the households which belong to lower land-
based economic condition after JFM programme. iii) after JFM forest provides much income 
generating opportunity for all categories of households in all FPC-villages. As regard forest wage 
labour is concerned, not only the landless and marginal categories of households but also small 
farmer category of households are involved in forestry works. This is due to attractive high forestry 
wage rate compared with local wage rate in non-forest sector. As mentioned earlier, forest wage rate 
and the number of working days as wage labour under forest department by the poor forest fringe 
communities are more or less fixed; iii) out of annual net real income from all sources, NTFPs’ 
share has increased in all FPCs for all categories of households, except small category of households 
in Baragari FPC. But most importantly, compared with before JFM period the change of annual net 
income of NTFPs after JFM, particularly, for landless and marginal categories of households, who 
are relatively asset poor than small categories of households and that live below poverty line, marks 
a major increases, ranging between 42.38 percentage point and 440.73 percentage point, in all FPC-
villages excepts landless and marginal categories of households in Baragari village. Conversely 
annual net real income from timber forest products (TFPs) generating from illegal source7 for 
landless and marginal categories of households in Baragari FPC-village has increased during after 
JFM period compared with before JFM period, whereas net annual real income from TFPs yielding 
from illegal source for the same categories of households in other FPC-villages has considerably 
decreased during the same period, ranging between 44.27 percentage point and 72.71 percentage 
point. Moreover, net annual real income from TFPs has considerably decreased for small category 
of households in all FPC-villages. 
The break-up of annual net real income from legal and illegal forest sources for below 
poverty line households before and after JFM situations appears in Table 4. It reveals that the illegal 
income from TFPs after JFM has substantially increased (30.59 percentage point) to poor categories 
of households which live below poverty line in Baragari joint FPC (column 9). The change of illegal 
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income from TFPs after JFM for the same categories of households to other FPC-villages is highly 
negative (ranging between 20.77 and 74.47 percentage points). This is mainly because the change of 
income from legal forest products of the poor categories of households of Baragari FPC after JFM is 
much lower than that of same categories of households in other FPCs. In all FPCs, except Baragari, 
the change of income from legal sources of forest is highly positive ranging between 42.91 
percentage point to 117.17 percentage point; in Baragari this change is negative (12.92 percentage 
point). It clearly indicates that force or law can not effectively control the illegal collection of TFPs 
of the poor categories of households, which live below poverty line, until and unless a considerable 
income from legal forest source meets up their bare minimum level of subsistence. 
However, while considering per capita annual net real income from forest source 
(PCANRIFS) as the payoff of the community together with the break-up of share of income from 
different sources, we also calculate the government’s economic outcome by considering annual net 
real income from forestland per FPC (ANRIFFPFPC) as the economic outcome (payoff) of the 
government. As mentioned earlier, the payoff of the Government of West Bengal (GoWB) from the 
degraded forest, particularly from south West Bengal is concerned, was almost nil for her SRP. A 
little payoff that GoWB would usually receive from this forestland was the auction sale of those 
trees that were removed by rain and/or by storm. As no specific government revenue had been 
reported from the FPC we surveyed before JFM was established and, on the contrary, government 
does not give an account of her little revenue for the particular division as a whole, we consider the 
critical ANRIFFPFPC for government as Re.1 for her SRP. 
  With a list of pure strategies available to each player, we now have the game of two-player (so 
that the industry is a duopoly) with two strategy sets G ={SRP, CP} and C ={FP, CP} along with its 
four distinct strategy profiles {SRP, FP}, {SRP, CP}. {CP, FP}, and {CP, CP} in the following 
simple form. It is assumed that both players choose annual net real income in per capita/per FPC 
terms rather than annual net money income. First, we use normal form of representation in 
analyzing static game (simultaneous move) of complete information8. In figure 1, payoff in the left 
hand side indicates the payoff of community and right hand side, the government’s payoff. 
Obviously for community, FP is strictly dominated by CP, because 2570>2359 and 
3723>2613. It seems to be important to mention that for government, the strategy SRP is said to be 
weakly dominated by CP9. But when a strictly dominated strategy equilibrium exists we can 
confidently predict that this will be the outcome of the game (Bierman and Fernandez, 1998: 34). So 
as a rational player, community will not play FP. Thus government knows that community is 
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rational; then government will eliminate FP from community’s strategy-space. SRP is now strictly 
dominated by CP for government. Thus community knows that government is rational, and then 
community will eliminate SRP from government’s strategy-space leaving the strategy profile (CP, 
CP) as the outcome of the game. This process is called iterated elimination of strictly dominated 
strategies. This outcome is Pareto optimum because it is not dominated by any other outcome of the 
game. The outcome (CP, CP) will hold good as producing cooperative is a dominant strategy for 
community. So the strategy profile (CP, CP) is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
But the long run viability of forest resource depends on the economic outcome of poor forest 
fringe community, which mainly depends on forest resource for their major source of income. As 
mentioned in Table 3, the main source of forest income is due to NTFPs. But the price per unit of 
some NTFPs like kendu leaves and sal seed, the collectors receive from its purchasers is very low in 
relation to the market price. What is more significant is that whatever amount of more valuable 
NTFPs per unit (in Rs.) the collectors desire to sell in the market they have only to sell it legally to 
the agents of LAMS (Large Adibasi Multipurpose Society), which usually pay to their collectors 
considerably lower price per unit for the amount the latter sell to the former. Table 5 shows that net 
profit per K.G. of kendu leaves for the agents of LAMPS is about hundred percent of the collector’s 
price. Similarly, net profit per K.G. of sal seeds is more than hundred percent of the collector’s 
price. This situation is more or less similar with Jharkhand state, very close to West Bengal state. In 
Jharkhand, Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation (JSFDC), licensed traders operating 
on behalf of the state, controls kendu leaves marketing in the state, where villagers are little more 
than collectors operating as pure price takers in a monopsony, with no bargaining position and no 
incentives to improve quality above minimum standards (World Bank, 2006: 46). 
However, the success of JFM programme with respect to economic outcome for forest fringe 
community and government of this study highlights some particular issues of the poor households 
of community, which live below poverty line: 1) more than 80 percent of net annual real income of 
poor forest fringe communities yield from forest source – legal or/and illegal source(s); 2) when 
NTFPs and wage income from forest are inadequate to meet the bare subsistence level of income of 
the poor forest communities, who live below poverty line, they are involved in yielding illegal 
income by removing timber forest products from the forest land to meet up their minimum 
livelihood security; 3) wage rate for forest wage labour is fixed at Rs. 67.50, which is about a 
double of the average local wage rate, for usually eight hours of service from 8am to 4pm; 4) forest 
wage rate and the number of working days as wage labour under forest department by the poor 
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forest fringe communities during present situation of JFM programme are more or less fixed; 5) the 
price per unit of some NTFPs the collectors (forest communities) receive from the agent of LAMPS 
is considerably lower than market price; and 6) the incidence of the dependence on forest income is 
considerably higher for the households which belong to lower economic condition after JFM 
programme. 
Hence the issue is: what are the means to overcome the problem of the poor categories of 
households, which live below poverty line, when legal forest income (income from legal forest 
products like NTFPs, fuel wood, timber share from government and wage income from forest) is 
inadequate to meet up their bare minimum level of subsistence? There seems to be three ways to 
tackle the situation – one is to increase the production of quick growing NTFPs, fuel wood etc. in 
order that the poor households may increase the legal collection of those products; but its proper 
execution is hardly short term in nature. The second is to increase the existing government wage 
rate and the increase of the number of working days as wage labour under the department of forest. 
But the existing government wage rate (Rs. 67.50/- for usually eight hours’ of work a day) is high 
enough as compared with the local wage rate (local wage rate ranges between Rs. 30 to 40 for 
usually eight hours’ of work a day). Similarly the increase of labour days also depends on new 
aforestation programme, which seem to be hardly possible within a short period. The third is to 
increase the per unit price of Forest Products (FPs) the collectors have to sell to the agents of 
LAMS. This measure seems to be useful for the short period. 
 
VI  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This empirical study suggests that the economic outcome of the JFM programme has been 
beneficial for both community belonging to marginal landholding, small landholding and landless 
agricultural households and government and this is due to the strict dominant cooperative strategy 
of community. But the earlier forest policy of the government was oriented with the commercial 
need of the government disregarding the traditional right and benefit of the forest fringe 
communities. Economically government was the worst sufferer for her SRP, because law or force 
could not effectively control the illegal collection of forest products of the poor forest fringe 
communities which mainly depend on income from forest resource and that live below poverty line, 
until and unless a bare minimum level of subsistence level of these communities was met up. The 
success of JFM programme has proved that active involvement of forest fringe communities in 
protection, regeneration and development planning of forest resource not only provides a significant 
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increase in income of the community but also begets a major increase in income of the government 
who failed to receive such income while she executed SRP. The higher economic outcome of the 
government is due to the cooperation of community whom government neglected earlier. Similarly, 
the coordinated action by the community, which belong to marginal landholding, small landholding 
and landless agricultural households, also help them generate a substantial increase of forest income 
after JFM as compared with before JFM mainly from two sources – NTFPs and forest wage, the 
highest contribution being the NTFPs’ source. But the incidence of forest income is higher for the 
households which belong to lower land-based economic condition and that live below poverty line 
after JFM. However, the CPR game of our study, which follows from our empirical evidence, 
suggests that the interaction between community and government over a trade off between 
economic outcome from extracting commonly owned renewable forest resource has been beneficial 
for both guided by cooperation (CP, CP) preferred by both parties within a variety of institutional 
arrangement under JFM programme leading, thereby, to exploit the forest more sustainably 
compared with the system of strict regulatory policy (SRP) of government before JFM. Although 
forest resource of south West Bengal including our study area was resuscitated and restored to 
productivity with great improved in quality and density after JFM compared with before JFM, as 
mentioned in SFR (2000:47), the institutional arrangement of JFM could not retain the poor 
households, which are mainly dependent on forest resource for their livelihood security and that live 
below poverty line, from illegal collection of timber products until and unless a considerable income 
from legal forest sources – NTFPs, forestry wage and government’ timber share – meets their 
livelihood security. This study also suggests that the prices per unit of NTFPs the collectors have to 
sell to the agents of LAMPS are considerably lower than their market prices. 
In this perspective, however, there seems to be three ways to tackle these problems within 
the existing JFM programme – one is to increase the production of quick growing NTFPs, fuelwood 
etc. in order that the very poor households may increase the legal collection of those products; but 
this depends on the participatory forest management programmes and its proper execution which is 
hardly short term in nature. Secondly, the existing government wage rate on forest work is 
considerably higher (about a double) than that of the average local wage rate. The increase of labour 
days by the forest department depends on new afforestation programme, which also seems to be 
hardly possible within a short period. The third is to increase the price per unit of NTFPs the 
collectors have to sell to the agents of LAMS. So, in order to have the higher economic outcome 
and the higher outreach of the JFM programme, government should restrict the power of the 
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LAMPS so that the collectors of NTFPs may sell their products at a higher price in the market and 
increase their income. But the increase of the collectors’ price of NTFPs may not increase 
considerable income of the households below poverty line for the long period. Together with it, 
more pro-poor programmes under both government and non-government initiatives that 
complement the benefit of JFM programme need to be introduced. 
 
 
Notes: 
1) Farm income implies earnings from sales of field crops including fruit crops. Self-employment 
includes non-forest based business like resale of agricultural commodities, tailor, money lending, sales 
of fish, grocery sales, public transport operation, radio and bike repair, tinsmith, and stone breaking. 
Wage work includes non-forest off-farm employment like contract agricultural labour, forestry officer, 
teacher, mechanic, watchman, and village headperson. Sales assets consider sales of livestock and 
poultry, property rental, and sales of personal and household items. Transfers include remittance from 
household residents, gifts from relatives, and loans. 
2) We take all samples for our study from Bankura district only since almost all female FPCs in West 
Bengal are operating in Bankura district, being extended to all three forest divisions – Bankura (north), 
Bankura (south), and Panchet S C – of the district. As this paper has been prepared based on PhD 
research work entitled ‘Women’s Dependence on Forest and Participation in Forestry: A Case 
Study of Joint Forest Management Programme in West Bengal’, we consider all samples from 
Bankura district in south West Bengal where the vast tract of forest land containing mainly the sal were 
overexploited and degraded before JFM situation. After JFM the forest land under our study have been 
resuscitated and restored to productivity with great improvement in quality and density. 
 
3) It is worth mentioning that forest officials usually take the primary initiative (during 1988-89) for 
the establishment of both joint FPC and female FPCs in this area. They first speak to the local forest 
communities, local panchayet bodies about the utility of the establishment of FPC under JFM 
programme. Later, local forest communities and local panchayet respond to it. 
4) In the irrigated area households possessing cultivable land between 0.01 and 2.49 acres are treated 
as marginal farmer households, between 2.50 and 4.99 acres, as small farmer households, while in the 
unirrigated area, this is twice the area of their irrigated lands. 
5) Poverty line income in rural West Bengal on the basis of PCME (per capita monthly expenditure) 
by NSS of 55th round (1999-00) is Rs. 350.17. Based on the CPIAL (Consumer Price Index of 
Agricultural Labour [General]) per capita monthly expenditure for the year 2005-06, the poverty line 
income for the year 2005-06 is calculated as Rs. 393 approximately.  
 
6) Indian Labour Journal (1991, Vol. 32, No. 4: p. 662) provides the Consumer Price Index Number of 
Agriculture Labour (General) for rural West Bengal on and from 1990-91 to 1995-96, the base year 
being 1960-61. Similarly, Indian Labour Journal (2005, Vol. 46, No. 12: p. 1225) provides the same for 
rural West Bengal on and from 1995-96 to 2005-06 with 1986-87 as base year. We then shift the base 
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year of 1960-61 to 1986-87 for all the years from 1990-91 to 2005-06. Again we shift the base year from 
1986-87 to 2005-06 and calculate the CPIAL from 1990-91 to 2005-06. 
 
7) Never did the respondents say that their source of income was illegal; rather, while examining the 
answers from the respondents regarding their break-up of their source of income, the distinction 
between legal and illegal source was clearly demarcated.   
 
8) It might be a game of complete information because each player’s payoff function (the function that 
determines the player’s payoff from the combination of action chosen by the players) is common 
knowledge among all the players (Gibbons, 1992: 2). 
 
9) SRP is no longer strictly dominated by CP, because both strategies provide same payoff (Re 1) to 
the government if community adopts a FP strategy, but strictly higher payoff to government if 
community adopts CP. 
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Table 1: Some Basic Characteristics of the Sample FPC/Village Households 
Status of agricultural land 
holding**  
Sex of FPC 
member 
 
Division 
 
FPC/Village 
 
No. of 
HH 
 
Average 
size of HH 
% of HH 
live below 
poverty 
 line* 
    
   Size of forest land 
    (ha.) protected  
      under JFMP Land less Marginal Small Female {Male} 
  % of HH 
  belongs to 
  SC [ST]  
  category 
% of  
 illiterate 
FPC  
 member 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Agua 23 4.52 100 13.75 19 4 0 23{0} 100 [0] 95.24 Bankura 
North Belboni 44 4.95 100 70 41 3 0 2{42} 100 [0] 86.36 
Malibona 41 4.97 95.12 70 4 35 2 41{0} 9.75[90.25] 51.22 Bankura 
South Baragari 45 5.44 77.78 70 3 32 10 2{43}  2.22 [8.89] 33.33 
 Brindabanpur 56 4.80 80.36 56 29 16 11 56{0} 100 [0] 77.50  Panchayet 
S C Katul-2 93 5.08 84.95 180 33 46 14 3{90} 100 [0] 42.63 
  
* Poverty line in year 2005-06 is per capita expenditure of Rs. 393 /- 
** Holding of agricultural land from 0.01 to 2.50 acres are treated as marginal, from 2.51 to 5.00 acres as small. For unirrigated land these would be doubled. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 2: Annual Net Real Income (in Rs.) from All Sources of Sample Households* 
Present Before % change  
 
FPC/ Village 
 
 
Category
of 
  house-
holds 
Net return from 
forest  
   sources 
                   
Net return from 
non-forest 
  sources 
                  
Net return 
 from all  
  sources 
                
Net return from 
forest  
   sources 
                   
 Net return   from 
non-forest  
   sources 
               
Net  return  
from all 
   sources 
                 
Net return 
from 
forest 
sources 
Net return 
from non-
forest 
source 
Net  
return 
from all 
sources 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Landless 
 
327825.8 
(86.14) 
0.29 52747.4 
(13.86) 
1.48 380573.2 
(100.00) 
1.08 
 
173018.4 
(64.36) 
0.36 95810.6 
(35.64) 
3.42 268829.0 
(100.00) 
2.11 
 
89.47 - 44.95 41.56  
Agua 
Marginal 
 
65496.0 
(85.06) 
0.38 11503.8 
(14.94) 
1.59 76999.80 
(100.00) 
1.19 
 
42175.6 
(67.87) 
0.48 19964.2 
(32.13) 
3.96 62139.8 
(100.00) 
2.49 
 
55.29 
 
- 42.38 
 
38.04 
 
CV
 CV  CV   CV  CV  CV 
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* The real income is determined after deflating the money income by cost of living index (general) of agricultural labour. We consider 2005-06 as the base year. 
   CV = coefficient of variation. 
 
 
Landless 
 
766193.2 
(87.66) 
0.24 107857.9 
(12.34) 
1.16 874051.1 
(100.00) 
1.01 
 
430512.0 
(63.92) 
0.33 243004.9 
(36.08) 
3.09 673516.9 
(100.00) 
1.90 
 
77.97 
 
- 55.61 29.77  
Belboni 
Marginal 
 
53202.7 
(85.84) 
0.30 8776.2 
(14.16) 
1.31 61978.9 
(100.00) 
1.12 
 
31508.2 
(64.89) 
0.44 17048.2 
(35.11) 
3.48 48556.4 
(100.00) 
2.21 
 
68.85 - 48.52 27.64 
Landless 
 
76308.4 
(89.62) 
0.32 8838.2 
(10.38) 
1.86 85146.6 
(100.00) 
1.30 
 
44898.8 
(65.12) 
0.38 24049.1 
(34.88) 
3.57 68947.9 
(100.00) 
2.20 
 
69.96 - 63.25 23.49 
Marginal 
 
681299.2 
(88.18) 
0.41 91324.0 
(11.82) 
1.92 772623.2 
(100.00) 
1.39 
 
425916.3 
(64.88) 
0.51 230551.6 
(35.12) 
3.95 656467.9 
(100.00) 
2.53 
 
59.96 - 60.39 17.69 
 
 
Malibona 
Small 
 
37745.8 
(86.20) 
0.83 6042.8 
(13.80) 
2.21 43788.60 
(100.00) 
1.96 
 
26510.9 
(78.51) 
1.25 7256.4 
(21.49) 
4.12 33767.3 
(100.00) 
3.36 
 
42.38 - 16.72 29.68 
Landless 
 
51154.2 
(72.16) 
0.39 19735.8 
(27.84) 
1.66 70890.00 
(100.00) 
1.27 
 
38831.5 
(64.11) 
0.62 21738.6 
(35.89) 
3.75 60570.1 
(100.00) 
2.54 
 
31.73 - 9.21 17.04 
Marginal 
 
574257.2 
(70.75) 
0.58 237413.8 
(29.25) 
2.12 811671.0 
(100.00) 
1.69 
 
460344.3 
(64.00) 
0.99 258943.6 
(36.00) 
3.92 719287.9 
(100.00) 
3.02 
 
24.74 - 8.31 12.84 
 
 
Baragari 
Small 
 
133182.4 
(56.06) 
0.98 104388.8 
(43.94) 
2.57 237571.2 
(100.00) 
2.31 
 
140987.2 
(61.56) 
1.67 88036.8 
(38.44) 
4.26 229024.0 
(100.00) 
3.85 
 
- 5.53 - 18.60 3.73 
Landless 
 
574140.6 
(81.24) 
0.35 132581.0 
(18.76) 
1.75 706721.6 
(100.00) 
1.25 
 
360161.6 
(62.10) 
0.41 219808.8 
(37.90) 
3.41 579970.4 
(100.00) 
2.17 
 
59.41 - 39.68 21.85 
Marginal 
 
298869.9 
(80.91) 
0.44 70515.7 
(19.09) 
1.99 369385.6 
(100.00) 
1.48 
 
214342.2 
(66.40) 
0.83 108461.4 
(33.60) 
3.68 322803.6 
(100.00) 
2.71 
 
43.42 - 34.98 14.43 
 
  
Brindabanpur 
Small 
 
166586.3 
(79.83) 
0.76 42090.1 
(20.17) 
2.57 208676.4 
(100.00) 
2.09 
 
116871.0 
(70.58) 
1.08 48718.5 
(29.42) 
3.89 165589.5 
(100.00) 
3.09 
 
42.54 - 13.60 26.02 
Landless 
 
651273.6 
(83.12) 
0.36 132260.6 
(16.88) 
1.82 783534.2 
(100.00) 
1.31 
 
374660.7 
(63.23) 
0.59 217875.5 
(36.77) 
3.50 592536.2 
(100.00) 
2.40 
 
73.83 - 39.29 32.23 
Marginal 
 
846732.2 
(82.55) 
0.51 178988.2 
(17.45) 
2.04 1025720.4 
(100.00) 
1.56 
 
519358.3 
(65.25) 
0.92 276542.3 
(34.75) 
3.82 795900.6 
(100.00) 
2.88 
 
63.03 - 35.28 28.87 
 
 
Katul-2 
Small 
 
295158.8 
(80.72) 
0.85 70498.8 
(19.28) 
2.55 
 
365657.6 
(100.00) 
2.18 
 
211210.5 
(72.20) 
1.14 81344.8 
(27.80) 
4.01 292553.3 
(100.00) 
3.20 
 
39.75 - 13.33 24.99 
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Table 3: Annual Net Real Income Share (in percentage) by Sources of Sample Households 
Net return from forest sources Net return from non-forest sources % change 
TFPsa Net return from forest sources Net return from non-forest sources 
FPC/Village Category 
of 
households 
 
NTFPs 
Forestry 
wage Total Illegal 
 
Farmb 
Non-forest 
wagec 
 
Othersd NTFPs Forestry wage TFPs Farm Non-forest wage Others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Landless 58.68 
(19.67) 
14.52 
(8.24) 
11.86 
(36.45) 
11.67 
(36.45) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
8.59 
(25.35) 
5.27 
(10.29) 
198.32 76.21 - 64.50 
[- 67.98] 
- - 66.11 - 48.79  
Agua Marginal 58.92 
(22.73) 
13.97 
(8.27) 
11.17 
(36.87) 
10.86 
(36.87) 
5.08 
(5.99) 
4.31 
(14.21) 
5.55 
(11.93) 
159.21 68.92 -66.99 
[- 70.57] 
- 15.19 - 69.67 - 53.48 
Landless 53.56 
(15.75) 
15.35 
(7.50) 
17.32 
(40.67) 
17.18 
(40.67) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
8.83 
(26.64) 
3.51 
(9.44) 
240.19 104.67 - 53.91 
[- 57.76] 
- - 66.85 - 62.82  
Belboni Marginal 54.54 
(14.45) 
13.34 
(8.18) 
16.96 
(42.26) 
16.34 
(42.26) 
4.72 
(5.17) 
4.55 
(18.78) 
4.89 
(11.16) 
277.47 63.08 - 57.51 
[- 61.33] 
- 8.70 - 75.77 - 56.18 
Landless 53.61 
(19.46) 
16.34 
(10.36) 
18.46 
(35.30) 
18.58 
(35.30) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
6.80 
(23.62) 
3.58 
(11.26) 
175.47 57.72 - 44.27 
[- 47.37] 
- - 71.21 - 68.21 
Marginal 55.93 
(19.61) 
14.17 
(10.41) 
17.68 
(34.86) 
17.03 
(34.86) 
4.58 
(4.90) 
2.40 
(16.45) 
4.84 
(13.77) 
185.19 36.12 - 48.12 
[- 51.15] 
- 6.53 - 85.41 - 64.85 
 
 
 
Malibona 
 
 
Small 59.79 
(38.14) 
11.62 
(7.75) 
14.79 
(32.62) 
13.73 
(32.62) 
7.35 
(7.62) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
6.45 
(13.87) 
56.76 49.94 - 54.66 
[- 57.92] 
- 3.54 - - 53.50 
Landless 17.55 
(14.46) 
8.61 
(6.64) 
45.99 
(43.01) 
44.85 
(43.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
18.44 
(22.45) 
9.40 
(13.44) 
21.39 29.67 6.94 
[4.28] 
- - 17.86 - 30.06 
Marginal 18.36 
(17.07) 
8.51 
(5.87) 
43.17 
(41.06) 
42.81 
(41.06) 
3.88 
(4.05) 
15.50 
(18.20) 
9.87 
(13.75) 
7.57 44.97 6.86 
[4.26] 
- 4.20 - 14.84 - 28.22 
 
 
 
Baragari 
 
 
Small 19.45 
(20.44) 
4.77 
(3.15) 
31.84 
(37.97) 
30.70 
(37.97) 
19.48 
(17.55) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
24.46 
(20.89) 
- 4.84 51.43 - 16.14 
[- 19.15] 
11.00 - - 17.09 
Landless 57.77 
(34.85) 
17.61 
(8.16) 
4.09 
(19.09) 
3.51 
(19.09) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
10.30 
(22.15) 
8.46 
(15.75) 
65.76 115.81 - 69.30 
[- 81.61] 
- - 53.50 - 46.29 
Marginal 58.89 
(41.36) 
17.24 
(8.08) 
3.41 
(16.96) 
2.30 
(16.96) 
6.32 
(7.56) 
4.07 
(9.86) 
8.70 
(16.18) 
42.38 113.37 - 71.80 
[- 86.44] 
- 16.4 -58.72 - 46.23 
 
 
 
Brindabanpur 
 
 
Small 64.62 
(48.39) 
12.05 
(6.40) 
3.16 
(15.79) 
0.14 
(15.79) 
10.94 
(12.05) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
9.23 
(17.37) 
33.54 88.28 - 79.99 
[- 99.11] 
- 9.21 - - 46.86 
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Landless 52.77 
(9.76) 
16.47 
(7.42) 
12.45 
(46.05) 
12.75 
(46.05) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
9.60 
(23.88) 
7.28 
(12.89) 
440.73 121.97 - 69.87 
[- 72.31] 
- - 59.80 - 43.52 
Marginal 54.67 
(14.01) 
15.80 
(6.98) 
11.78 
(44.26) 
10.88 
(44.26) 
6.57 
(6.90) 
3.25 
(12.84) 
7.63 
(15.01) 
290.23 126.36 - 72.71 
[- 75.42] 
- 4.78 - 74.69 - 49.17 
 
 
 
Katul-2 
 
 
Small 59.90 
(26.24) 
11.48 
(5.33) 
9.34 
(40.63) 
8.32 
(40.63) 
11.06 
(11.51) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
8.22 
(16.29) 
128.28 115.38 - 77.01 
[- 79.53] 
- 3.91 - - 49.54 
  
Notes: 1. Figures within ( ) and [ ] represent the value during before situation of JFM programme and percentage change of illegal timber forest products respectively; 
            
 2. a) TFPs(timber forest products) include net return from two sources – share from government’ timber sale and sale of illegally collected timber; b) net return 
from sale of farm crops including households crops; c) non-forest wage includes farm and/or non-farm labour wage other than forest wage employment; and 
d) others’ non-forest source includes net return from self-employment(business activities like market middle man, tailor, and radio and bike repair) and net 
return from sale of livestock, personal and household items etc. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Annual Net Real Income (Rs.) from Forest for BPL Categories of Households  
Present net return of forest from Before net return of forest from % change  FPC/ Village 
Legal 
sources 
Illegal 
sources 
All sources Legal 
sources 
Illegal 
sources 
All sources Legal 
sources 
Illegal 
sources 
All sources 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Agua 281848 
(71.66) 
45360 
(11.53) 
393322 
[85.96] 
136594 
(63.47) 
78600 
(36.52) 
215194 
[65.00] 
106.34 
 
- 42.29 
 
82.78 
Belboni 549153 
(67.02) 
140280 
(17.12) 
819396 
[87.54] 
273620 
(59.22) 
188400 
(40.78) 
462020 
[63.98] 
100.70 
 
- 25.54 
 
77.35 
Malibona 516157 
(68.13) 
130200 
(17.19) 
757608 
[88.32] 
306487 
(65.10) 
164278 
(34.90) 
470765 
[64.90] 
68.41 
 
- 20.77 
 
60.93 
Baragari 255426 
(40.84) 
268800 
(42.98) 
625411 
[70.86] 
293343 
(58.76) 
205833 
(41.23) 
499176 
[64.00] 
- 12.92 
 
30.59 
 
25.28 
 Brindabanpur 670515 
(76.80) 
26880 
(3.08) 
873010 
[81.13] 
469198 
(81.67) 
105306 
(18.33) 
574504 
[63.64] 
42.91 
 
- 74.47 
 
51.96 
Katul-2 1067680 
(71.27) 
174720 
(11.66) 
1498006 
[82.80] 
491638 
(54.99) 
402381 
(45.01) 
894019 
[64.39] 
117.17 
 
- 56.58 
 
67.56 
Total  → 556796 
(67.13) 
131040 
(15.83) 
827792 
[82.51] 
328480 
(63.26) 
190808 
(36.74) 
519288 
[64.25] 
69.51 - 31.32 59.41 
  
* Figures within ( ) represent percentages out of total forest income; Figures within [ ] represent percentages of forest income out of total income. 
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Table 5: Variation in Price of Some Valuable NTFPs the Collectors’ sell to the Agents of LAMPS                      Rs. per KG 
       Midvalue and range+ 
Name of 
NTFPs 
 Collectors’ price       Processing, transport               Market price                                Profit * 
                                        and other costs 
1            2                                          3                                              4                                                5 
Kendu leaves 
Sal seeds 
       20±5                                    13±4                                       52±4.50                                     19±4.50 
    0.75±0.50                            1.50±0.70                               4.00±0.60                                  1.75±0.60 
   
+  The method is suggested by Rudra (1992) 
* Column 5 = [ 4 – ( 2 + 3 ) ] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Payoff matrix of players 
 
 
 
                                                                      Government’s strategy   → 
                                                                   SRP                                  CP 
Community’s                            
   strategy       ↓               FP 
                                                 
                                        CP 
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